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ABSTRACT 
Parent and child interaction is an important determinant of child health. Typically, parents are 
more forward-looking than their children and, hence, care about investments in human capital to a 
larger extent. In this paper we consider the parent-child health-related interaction, when the parent 
is altruistic and forward-looking and the child is egoistic and short-sighted. The child receives a 
monetary transfer, from the parent, which is used to finance either health-unrelated consumption 
or unhealthy behaviour. We apply a simple differential-game approach, assuming linear-state 
preferences, and study equilibrium time-paths of (a) the parental transfer, (b) the unhealthy 
behaviour, and (c) the stock of child health capital. We distinguish between the case in which the 
child is perfectly myopic and the case in which he or she is forward looking.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Family decision making and human-capital related decisions are intimately connected, and the 
resulting intertemporal allocation of resources is the fundament for most economies. Gary Becker 
(1972a, b; 1974, 1976), who is the most renowned researcher in this field of economics, was one of 
the pioneers of the development of the economic theories of the family and of human capital. His 
contributions have inspired several currently thriving directions of research. Individual health-
related decision making is but one example. Investments in child health capital are decided and 
executed in a family context. There are several reasons why – for instance, the frequently 
mentioned demographical transition that most Western societies are going through – investments 
in child health may be among the most important issues for economists to study. Theoretical 
efforts to integrate human-capital theory with economic theories of family decision making have 
not produced tools for the analysis of investments in child human capital, in a family context, 
when actions cannot be governed by enforceable contracts. In other words, human-capital theory 
needs to be integrated with methods for handling dynamic and strategic family-based decision 
making.   
 
The human-capital theory developed by Becker (1964) was extended by Michael Grossman (1972a, 
b) in order to include health as a separate component of the individual's stock of human capital. 
Grossman's model has since then been extended towards a family setting (Jacobson, 2000; Bolin et 
al., 2001, 2002a, b). The importance of the parent-child interaction for the investments in child 
health in a theoretical health-capital context has received little or no attention, though. However, 
strategic parent-child interaction has been recognised in the economic theoretical literature as a 
fundamental aspect of family decision-making, at least since Becker published his treatise on the 
family (1981).  
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Several authors have argued that, since actions within the family cannot be regulated by 
enforceable contracts, strategic behaviour needs to be taken into account when analysing intra-
family decision making (see, for instance, King, 1982; Konrad and Lommerud, 1995; Dufwenberg, 
2002; Oosterbeek et al., 2003). The survey of economic theories of the family that was published 
by Bergström (1997) focused on consensus models of the family, and strategic considerations were 
only briefly discussed. No doubt, this owes to the fact that, at the time, non-cooperative game 
theory was largely unexplored as a means of studying the family. More recent contributions to this 
field include the parent-child interaction, but from the perspectives of children competing for 
parental resources (Chang, 2009; and Chang et al., 2005).  
 
Typically, theoretical approaches to the parent-child interaction involves altruism, on account of 
the parent, and egoism, on account of the child(-ren). In general, incentives for strategic behaviour 
arise whenever enforceable contracts cannot be used to govern individual actions. Few, if any, 
domestic actions taken by individual members of a family can be controlled by legally enforceable 
contracts. Thus, the family scene is exposed to strategic behaviour, and the parent-child 
relationship is no exception. However, parental decisions taken with the objective of investing in 
their childrens' health may be less vulnerable to strategic behaviour since (a) children make no 
intentional investments on their own and, hence, cannot strategically offset parental investment by 
lowering their own investments, and (b) parents are able to monitor and enforce – at least to some 
degree – healthy habits. On the other hand, children that have reached the age where some 
autonomy becomes an essential part of eventually becoming an independent adult, but are still 
dependent on the family for survival, may be able to behave strategically in relation to the 
"freedom" they are offered by their parents as an essential part of becoming an adult. This may 
have important consequences for the development of human capital of children and adolescents. 
In this paper, we will develop an economic theoretical model of parent-child strategic and dynamic 
interaction as a determinant of unhealthy child behaviour. Adolescent behaviour that is not 
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approved of by parents may, nevertheless, be paid for, unintentionally, by parents who transfer 
monetary resources to their children. 
    
In spite of the large stock of theoretical health-economic research that has been published during 
the last three decades, no attention has been paid to parental investments in child health, explicitly 
taking into account offsetting unhealthy child behaviour. Becker (1981) argued that parents have 
become less confident that they are able to govern the behaviour of their children. Even though 
Becker did not explicitly mention health-related behaviour, there can be no doubt that some 
adolescent behaviours include actions that have, potentially, considerable adverse health effects. 
Although parents' preferences typically are altruistic with respect to their children, it seems natural 
to assume that this altruism is somewhat mixed with paternalism. More specifically, parents take 
the wellbeing of their children into account when allocating time and resources between different 
competing uses, but they do so by making decisions that differ from the decisions that the child 
him- or herself had made had he or she been given perfect authority over the resources. In a 
widened perspective, parents may also hold altruistic preferences towards grand-children and 
subsequent generations. Therefore, parental resources may not only be devoted to the making of 
healthy and well-educated children, but also take grandchildren into account.  
 
In contrast to parental far-sighted and altruistic preferences that may embrace at least two 
succeeding generations, the preferences of children and adolescents are in general thought of as 
being more or less egoistic and relatively short-sighted. Thus, any resources controlled by 
adolescents in a family will be put to use in a way which is perceived, by the parents, possible to 
improve. For example, parents and children may disagree concerning the optimal level of certain 
child activities and consumption, for instance, hazardous sports, alcohol consumption, pre-marital 
sex, schoolwork habits and unwholesome eating.        
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In a world of perfect information and perfect ability of enforcing rules, parents would “only” be 
faced with the planers problem of deciding the optimal allocation of resources. However, since 
children can only be governed imperfectly, parents have to decide how resources should be 
allocated given strategic, selfish and short-sighted child behaviour. This is reminiscent of Becker’s 
famous Rotten-kid theorem, which implies that a selfish child will cooperate in maximising family 
welfare if financial incentives are properly tuned. Thus, a parent who faces a related, but more 
complex, situation of making optimal investments in child health during the child’s upbringing may 
use monetary transfers not only as a means of fulfilling altruistic objectives, but also as a tool for 
influencing child behaviour. Thus, the size of monetary transfers is rationally determined as a 
balance between altruism and paternalistic parental preferences.        
 
In this paper, we will focus on the importance of the parent-child interaction in determining child 
health-related behaviour and future health. We will analyse the significance of myopic, as well as of 
more farsighted, child preferences. For this purpose, we need to apply the techniques developed 
for analysing equilibrium strategies in differential games (Dockner et al., 2000). For simplicity, a 
particularly tractable class of games will be applied – linear state games (Dockner et al., 2000). This 
class of games is both (relatively) tractable and has the advantageous property that an open-loop 
Nash equilibrium is Markov perfect (Dockner et al., 2000).  Differential games have been applied 
to various areas in economics, for example, resource economics, industrial organisation and 
different political economics issues (for and application to terrorism, see, Novak et al., 2010). Some 
applications have also been published in the theoretical human-capital based macroeconomic 
literature (see, for instance, Hori and Shibata, 2010). The theoretical modelling of dynamic and 
strategic interactions within the family has also been subject to efforts from mathematicians and 
biologists (see, for instance, Ewald et al., 2007). 
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The natural point of departure for an economic analysis of the parent-child interaction in the 
determination of child health is the Grossman model. Grossman’s demand-for-health model is the 
dominating economic-theoretical model of individual health behaviour (Grossman, 1972a, b).1 In 
this paper, we will adopt the basic notion of the demand for health model – that individuals 
produce their own health. The parent-child interaction in the process that determines investments 
in child health capital has not yet been analysed within a demand-for-health framework (to the best 
of our knowledge). The focus of our interest is the effect of child farsightedness when it comes to 
the allocation of parental monetary transfers between different uses that are health-related or 
independent on health. A more farsighted child would have stronger preferences for health than a 
myopic child, ceteris paribus, which means that a given transfer would be used in order to exert a 
smaller detrimental health effect. On the other hand, parental incentives for making the transfer 
would be less curbed if the child is more farsighted.  
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Next, we will present the model, which we will 
solve for both the case of a myopic child and the case of a more farsighted child. After that, we 
will discuss the optimality conditions and compare parental and child behaviour in these two cases. 
The final section contains discussion and conclusions.   
  
THE MODEL 
General structure  
The general structure of the demand-for-human-capital-type model developed below is as follows: 
one parent with preferences that are altruistic and dynastic, and one egoistic child, interact in a 
                                                          
1
 Since its introduction, the demand-for-health model has been extended in various ways. For instance, in order to 
incorporate (a) uncertainty (Dardanoni and Wagstaff, 1987, 1990, Selden, 1993, Chang, 1996, and Liljas, 1998, 2000); 
(b) the family as producer of health (Jacobson, 2000, Bolin et al., 2001, 2002a); (c) and the employer as producer of 
health (Bolin et al., 2002b), and (d) healthy and unhealthy consumption (Forster, 2001).  The basic features of the 
demand-for-health model are (1) that the individual demands health (a) for its utility enhancing effects (the 
consumption motive), and (b) for its effect on the amount of healthy time (the investments motive), (2) that the 
demand for investments in health is derived from the more fundamental demand for health, (3) that the investments in 
health is produced by the individual, and (4) that the stock of health depreciates at each point in time.  
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dynamic setting which determines the time-path of child human capital, 𝐻(𝑡). The parent cares 
about the child's welfare beyond the current finite planning horizon (𝑡 = 𝑇). More specifically, the 
value that the parent puts on child health at the end of the planning horizon is strictly larger than 
zero, reflecting the parent's dynastic preferences. The child allocates a parental monetary transfer, 
𝑀(𝑡), between an activity, which is detrimental to human capital, 𝜃(𝑡), and consumption, 𝑐(𝑡), 
that does not influence the stock of human capital, while the parent makes choices about the size 
of the transfer, based on preferences that balances paternalism and altruism. We assume that the 
parent derives instantaneous utility from current child human capital and the monetary transfer, 
but not from the child's activities. Thus, the parent is altruistic in a paternalistic sense.2  
 
Budget constraint 
For simplicity, we assume that there are no financial markets and, hence, that total parental 
spending at time 𝑡 equals income at time 𝑡. Total parental income is comprised of a guaranteed 
income, 𝑦, and a variable income determined by the stock of child human capital.3 The marginal 
productivity of child health, with respect to parental income, is constant, and denoted ℎ. Hence, 
the parent’s budget constraint is, with the constant marginal cost of gross investments in child 
human capital, 𝐼(𝑡), denoted 𝜋: 
𝑀(𝑡) = 𝑦(𝑡) − 𝜋 ∙ 𝐼(𝑡) =  𝑦 + ℎ ∙ 𝐻(𝑡) − 𝜋 ∙ 𝐼(𝑡). (1) 
The child performs the human-capital detrimental activity at a constant marginal cost, 𝑝𝜃, and buys 
the the human-capital unrelated consumption good at the constant marginal cost 1. Thus, the 
child's budget constraint is: 
                                                          
2 Of course, this setting constitutes a harsh simplification of the true interactions between parent and child. For 
instance, parental altruism and paternalism may reach beyond caring for child health and being indifferent to child 
consumption choices, and there may be several other arenas for strategic behaviour other than child human capital. 
For our purpose, however, it suffices to model one asset stock – child human capital – and two choice variables that 
make the allocation strategic – the parental transfer and the level of the child’s unhealthy activities. Essentially, this 
means that we assume that the decisions pertaining to child human capital can be made separately from other decisions 
in the family. This is also consistent with, or even implied by, the linear-state assumption.        
3 Child health is part of the stock of child human capital, and child health influence the parent’s labour market 
performance. 
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𝑀(𝑡) = 𝑐(𝑡) + 𝑝𝜃 ∙ 𝜃(𝑡). (2)  
  
Preferences 
Parental preferences 
We employ a linear-state framework, and assume that the parent's instantaneous marginal utility of 
making the transfer, 𝑀(𝑡), is strictly increasing and concave in 𝑀(𝑡).4 Further, for simplicity we 
assume that the instantaneous marginal utility of the transfer is quadratic function of 𝑀(𝑡), with 
marginal utility equal to 𝑈0 > 0 when 𝑀(𝑡) = 0. Thus, parental preferences are represented by 
the following instantaneous quasi-linear utility function:  
𝑈𝑝(𝐻(𝑡), 𝑀(𝑡)) = 𝐻(𝑡) + 𝑈0 ∙ 𝑀(𝑡) −
1
2
∙ 𝑀(𝑡)2, (3) 
And the value that the parent associates with end-state child health, 𝑎 ∙ 𝐻(𝑇) (𝑎 is a strictly 
positive constant).   
 
Child preferences 
The child receives utility from own health, unhealthy behaviour, 𝜃(𝑡), and from health-unrelated 
consumption, 𝑐(𝑡). The behaviour is unhealthy in the sense that the specific level of behaviour at 
𝑡, 𝜃(𝑡) = 𝜃, adds negatively to the health stock at that point in time. Due to the linear-state 
framework adopted, child preferences are represented by a quasi-linear Cobb-Douglas-type utility 
function: 
𝑈𝑐(𝜃(𝑡), 𝐶(𝑡)) = 𝐻(𝑡) + 𝜃(𝑡) ∙ 𝑐(𝑡). (4) 
 
Equation of motion of the child health stock 
The stock of child health evolves through time as a consequence of (1) parental investments, 𝐼(𝑡), 
(2) the child's unhealthy behaviour, 𝜃(𝑡), and (3) natural depreciation of the existing stock of child 
                                                          
4 Linear-state games have applied to different areas of economics. For an overview se, for instance, Van Long (2010). 
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health capital at rate 𝛿. We assume that the rate of depreciation is constant over the planning 
horizon, 𝛿 (0 < 𝛿 < 1).5,6 Thus, the equation of motion for the stock of health capital is: 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝐼(𝑡) −  𝜑 ∙ 𝜃(𝑡) − 𝛿 ∙ 𝐻(𝑡), (5) 
where 𝜑 reflects the severity of the adverse impact that each unit of 𝜃 imposes on health. We 
assume that 𝜑 > 0. 
 
The control problems 
We will analyse two types of situations. In the first, the child is perfectly myopic and, hence, cares 
only about instantaneous utility. In the second case, the child is less short-sighted and assigns a 
strictly positive value to his or her health at 𝑡 = 𝑇. The planning horizon is fixed at 𝑡 = 𝑇 in both 
cases (for the parent only, in the first case).  
 
The myopic child  
In this case, the child’s allocation at 𝑡 can be incorporated as part of the parent’s optimization 
problem, making this a one-individual problem. The parent discounts future utility at rate 𝜌𝑝 and, 
hence, acts as if solving the following vertical terminal line problem:7 
max𝑀,𝐻(𝑇) ∫ 𝑒
−𝜌∙𝑡 ∙ [𝐻(𝑡) + (𝑈0 ∙ 𝑀(𝑡) −
1
2
∙ 𝑀(𝑡)2)
𝑇
0
] 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝐻(𝑇) ∙ 𝑒−𝜌𝑝∙𝑇 ,  (6) 
subject to (4) and the transversality condition 𝐻(𝑇) free ⇒ 𝜆(𝑇) = 𝑎, and 𝐻(0) = 𝐻0 ≥ 0. 
 
                                                          
5 This may seem as a restrictive assumption. However, the focus of our analysis is not the effects of ageing and, hence, 
a rate of depreciation that increases over time is not essential for our purposes.  
6 Grossman (1972), Muurinen (1982), Wagstaff (1986), Liljas (1998), Jacobson (2000), and Bolin et al. (2001a), 
examined models with time-dependent rates of depreciation. 
7 A vertical terminal line problem is to be distinguished from a horizontal terminal line problem. The optimality 
conditions resulting from these two types of problems only differ regarding the transversality conditions. Endogenous 
length of life is possible to handle using the horizontal terminal line problem. The individual’s life-time optimisation 
problem was formulated as a vertical time line problem by, for instance, Bolin et al (2001; 2002b, c). 
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At each point in time the child allocates the parental transfer, 𝑀(𝑡), in order to maximize (4). This 
gives the child's optimal behaviour as 𝜃(𝑡) =
𝑀(𝑡)
2∙𝑝𝜃
. Applying optimal control theory to solve the 
parent's optimization problem, (6), leaves us with the following current-value Hamilton function:8 
ℋ(𝑡) = 𝐻(𝑡) + (𝑈0 ∙ 𝑀(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡)
2) + 𝜆(𝑡) ∙ (
𝑦(𝐻(𝑡))−𝑀(𝑡)
𝜋
−  𝜑 ∙
𝑀(𝑡)
2∙𝑝𝜃
− 𝛿 ∙ 𝐻(𝑡)), 
where 𝑀(𝑡) = 𝑦(𝐻(𝑡)) − 𝜋 ∙ 𝐼(𝑡) has been used to substitute for 𝐼(𝑡). The maximum principle 
yields the following equation of motion (arguments left out for brevity): 
?̇? = −ℋ𝐻 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝜆 = −1 − 𝜆 ∙ (
ℎ
𝜋
− 𝛿) + 𝜌 ∙ 𝜆. (7) 
Then, we have the first order conditions for the control variable: 
ℋ𝑀 = (𝑈0 − 2 ∙ 𝑀
∗) +  𝜆∗ ∙ (−
1
𝜋
−
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
) ≤ 0.  (8) 
From these first-order conditions the following conclusion can be drawn: 
 
Claim 1: assume that the marginal productivity of (child) health capital, ℎ, is larger than the 
marginal cost of (child) health capital, (𝛿 + 𝜌𝑝) ∙ 𝜋, then the parental transfer, 𝑀, and the amount 
of the health-adverse behaviour, 𝜃, are increasing over time.   
 
Proof: the solution to the differential equation (7) is: 𝜆(𝑡)∗ = 𝑒(
ℎ
𝜋
−𝛿−𝜌𝑝)∙(𝑇−𝑡) ∙ (𝑎 +
1
ℎ
𝜋
−𝛿−𝜌𝑝
) −
1
ℎ
𝜋
−𝛿−𝜌𝑝
. Since, by assumption, 
ℎ
𝜋
− 𝛿 − 𝜌𝑝 > 0, it follows that ?̇? < 0. Taking the time derivative of 
(8) establishes that ?̇?(𝑡) ≥ 0 for 𝑡 ≥ 0. The second part of the Claim follows from ?̇?(𝑡) =
?̇?(𝑡)
2𝑝𝜃
. 
 
                                                          
8
 The maximum principle gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal control of 𝑀(𝑡), given the time 
path of the state variable 𝐻(𝑡), provided that the Hamilton function is strictly concave. The Hamilton function is 
concave (𝐻, 𝑀)., as can be seen by the following: First, notice that ℋ𝐻𝑀 = ℋ𝑀𝐻 = 0. Second, the diagonal terms are: 
ℋ𝐻𝐻 = 0, and ℋ𝑀𝑀 = −2. Thus, the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in (𝐻, 𝑀). 
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Notice, that Claim 1 does not rule out that the transfer equals 0 for an initial time-period. More 
precisely, if 𝑈0 < 𝜆(0) ∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
), the transfer will be 0 at 𝑡 = 0 (since 𝜕𝐻[𝐻(𝑡) +
(𝑈0 ∙ 𝑀(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡)
2)] = 1, and since 𝜆(𝑇) = 𝑎, we are guaranteed that 𝜆(𝑡) > 0 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] 
(Caputo, 2005; p. 56). If this is the case, the transfer will become strictly positive at a specific point 
in time, 𝑡 = ?̂?, for which 𝑈0 = 𝜆(?̂?) ∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
). Further, it follows from the above that if 
𝑈0 < 𝑎 ∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
), the parent will never make a strictly positive transfer. The optimal time-path 
of the parental transfer, 𝑀(𝑡)∗, can be constructed by solving the differential equation (7) and 
substitute the solution in (8). This gives: 𝑀(𝑡)∗ =
𝑈0
2
−
𝜆(𝑡)∗
2
∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
). Given the level of 
inherited health (𝐻0), a closed-form expression of the optimal time-path of child health capital can 
be found by solving the differential equation obtained from substituting for 𝑀(𝑡)∗ in (5) (see the 
appendix).  
 
The following conclusions can be drawn regarding the optimal time path of health capital and 
gross health investments. 
 
Claim 2: Assume that ℎ > 𝛿 ∙ 𝜋, then  
𝑦
𝜋
>
𝑈0
2
∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
) is a sufficient condition for child health 
capital to be increasing over the entire planning period. 
 
Proof: the claim about the health stock follows from, first, formulating the general solution of 
equation (5), and, second, taking the time derivative of this expression (using Leibnitz rule). For 
details, see the appendix.  
 
The result stated in Claim 2 assures that for a high enough guaranteed income both the parental 
transfer and the stock of child health will increase over time. The time-path of parental 
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investments in child health does not mirror the optimal time-path of health capital. This is so since 
the child influences his or her health by exerting the health-related behaviour, 𝜃. The parental 
investment in child health over time can be obtained from the parent's budget condition: 𝐼(̇𝑡) =
1
𝜋
(ℎ?̇?(𝑡) − ?̇?(𝑡)𝜑), the sign of which may be positive or negative, depending on the relation 
between the time paths of health capital and the transfer. Under the assumption made in Claim 1, 
it is clear that gross health investments are on a decreasing trajectory if the health stock is 
stationary or at a decreasing trajectory. However, that clear-cut result presupposes that the 
assumption made in Claim 2 is violated. In cases when Claim 2 apply, however, the direction of the 
optimal time path of gross health investments is ambiguous. However, adding the requirement that 
(
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
) >  
ℎ
𝜋
− 𝛿 − 𝜌𝑝 guarantees that gross health investments are on an increasing trajectory.  
 
The results when the child is myopic can be summarized as follows: Due to the Cobb-Douglas 
preferences assumed for the child he or she chooses 𝜃(𝑡)∗ =
𝑀(𝑡)∗
2∙𝑝𝜃
, i.e., a fixed share of the 
transfer is used for financing the unhealthy behaviour. The parent optimally transfers 𝑀(𝑡)∗ =
𝑈0
2
−
𝜆(𝑡)∗
2
∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
), which means that the parent transfers more and more over time; at 𝑡 = 𝑇 
the transfers has grown (maintaining the assumption that if the marginal productivity of health 
capital, ℎ, is larger than the marginal cost of health capital, (𝛿 + 𝜌𝑝) ∙ 𝜋) to 
𝑈0
2
−
𝑎
2
∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
). 
Moreover, the parent transfers more money at each point in time, ceteris paribus, the higher the 
marginal cost of 𝜃, the higher is the marginal cost of gross health investments, and the smaller is 
the marginal health damage of 𝜃, 𝜑. Further, the higher (marginal) value that the parent puts on 
child end-state health, reflected by 𝑎, the smaller amount is transferred at each 𝑡. There is a level of 
guaranteed income for which the health stock will increase over the entire planning horizon. 
 
The forward-looking child 
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When the child begins to take future consequences of current behaviour into account, the parent-
child interaction becomes strategic in a non-trivial sense. When deciding about the transfer to the 
child, the parent can no longer ignore intertemporal strategic effects. Similarly, the child starts to 
take parental responses into account when deciding about how to divide a given transfer between 
unhealthy behaviour and health-unrelated consumption. Formally, the parent acts as if solving (6), 
in which 𝜃(𝑡) =
𝑀(𝑡)
2∙𝑝𝜃
 has been replaced by the child's strategic response, 𝜃(𝑡). The child acts as if 
solving the following vertical terminal line problem, discounting future utility at rate 𝜌𝐶 , and : 
max𝜃,𝐻(𝑇) ∫ 𝑒
−𝜌𝑐∙𝑡 ∙ [𝐻(𝑡) + 𝜃(𝑡) ∙ 𝐶(𝑡)
𝑇
0
] 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑏 ∙ 𝐻(𝑇) ∙ 𝑒−𝜌𝐶∙𝑇,  (9) 
subject to (4) and the transversality condition 𝐻(𝑇) free ⇒ 𝜆𝑐(𝑇) = 𝑏. 
 
Thus, the choices that result from this strategic parent-child interaction are assumed to be arrived 
at as if both parties simultaneously solve their respective dynamic optimization problem, each 
taking the strategic response by the other into account. Formally, we seek time-paths for 
𝑀(𝑡), 𝜃(𝑡), and 𝐻(𝑡) so that both parties optimality conditions and transversality conditions are 
simultaneously satisfied. This leaves us with the following system of Hamilton functions: 
ℋ𝑝(𝑡) = 𝐻(𝑡) + (𝑈0 ∙ 𝑀(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡)
2) + 𝜆𝑝(𝑡) ∙ (
𝑦(𝐻(𝑡))−𝑀(𝑡)
𝜋
−  𝜑 ∙ 𝜃(𝑡) − 𝛿 ∙ 𝐻(𝑡)), 
ℋ𝑐(𝑡) = 𝐻(𝑡) + 𝜃(𝑡) ∙ 𝐶(𝑡) + 𝜆𝑐(𝑡) ∙ (
𝑦(𝐻(𝑡))−𝑀(𝑡)
𝜋
−  𝜑 ∙ 𝜃(𝑡) − 𝛿 ∙ 𝐻(𝑡)). (10) 
Further, the maximum principle yields the following equations of motion (again, arguments left out 
for brevity), which must be fulfilled by the solution (𝜆𝑝∗, 𝜆𝑐∗): 
?̇?𝑝
∗
= −ℋ𝐻
𝑝 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝜆𝑝∗ = −1 − 𝜆𝑝∗ ∙ (
ℎ
𝜋
− 𝛿) + 𝜌𝑝 ∙ 𝜆
𝑝∗.  
?̇?𝑐
∗
= −ℋ𝐻
𝑐 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝜆𝑐∗ = −1 − 𝜆𝑐∗ ∙ (
ℎ
𝜋
− 𝛿) + 𝜌𝑐 ∙ 𝜆
𝑐∗. (11) 
In both cases, closed-form solutions can be obtained:  
𝜆𝑝(𝑡)∗ = 𝑒(
ℎ
𝜋
−𝛿−𝜌𝑝)∙(𝑇−𝑡) ∙ (𝑎 +
1
ℎ
𝜋
−𝛿−𝜌𝑝
) −
1
ℎ
𝜋
−𝛿−𝜌𝑝
, and 
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𝜆𝑐(𝑡)∗ = 𝑒(
ℎ
𝜋
−𝛿−𝜌𝑐)∙(𝑇−𝑡) ∙ (𝑏 +
1
ℎ
𝜋
−𝛿−𝜌𝑐
) −
1
ℎ
𝜋
−𝛿−𝜌𝑐
. (12) 
Further, the first-order conditions for optimal choices of the transfer and the unhealthy behaviour, 
𝑀(𝑡)∗ and 𝜃(𝑡)∗, are: 
ℋ𝑀
𝑝 = (𝑈0 − 2 ∙ 𝑀
∗) +  𝜆𝑝∗ ∙ (−
1
𝜋
) = 0, 
ℋ𝜃
𝑐 = 𝑀∗ − 2 ∙ 𝑝𝜃 ∙ 𝜃
∗ +  𝜆𝑐∗ ∙ (−𝜑) = 0. (13) 
 
Solving this system for 𝑀∗ and 𝜃∗ yields: 𝑀∗ =
𝑈0
2
−
𝜆𝑝
∗
2𝜋
 and 𝜃∗ =
𝑈0
4𝑝𝜃
−
𝜆𝑝
∗
4𝑝𝜃𝜋
−
𝜑𝜆𝑐
∗
2𝑝𝜃
. It is 
immediately clear that the parental transfer is lower (1) the lower the marginal cost of health 
investments, (2) the higher the value that the parent puts on end-point child health (𝑎), and (3) the 
more forward looking the parent is (lower 𝜌𝑝). Similarly, less of the health-adverse behaviour will 
be exerted (1) the more forward looking the parent is (lower 𝜌𝑝), (2) the more forward looking the 
child is (lower 𝜌𝑐), and (3) the larger the marginal adverse health effect (𝜑) of the behaviour.  The 
corresponding changes over time of the parental transfer, the unhealthy behaviour exerted, and the 
amount of child health capital fulfils the following statement: 
 
Claim 3: (i) the parental transfer, 𝑀, and the amount of the health-adverse behaviour, 𝜃, are  
 increasing over time; and  
 (ii) assume that ℎ > 𝛿 ∙ 𝜋, then 
𝑦
𝜋
>
𝑈0
2
∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
) is a sufficient condition for the stock  
 of child health capital to be increasing over the entire planning period. 
 
Proof: part (i) follows from the time derivatives of 𝑀∗ and 𝜃∗. Part (ii) is shown in the appendix.  
 
One observation seems particularly important: the conclusions that the parent makes strictly larger 
transfers in the forward-looking case than in the myopic case, and that the level of child health is 
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increasing over the entire planning horizon, do not rely on any specific assumption concerning 
how the level of child health is valued at the end of the planning horizon or the rate of time 
preferences.     
 
In the previous section, we showed that under specific assumptions the health stock increases over 
time for the myopic child. The same condition applies also in the forward-looking case. So far, we 
have not said anything about the size of the health stock when the child is forward looking as 
compared to when he or she is perfectly myopic. The results in Claim 3 do not in tell us whether 
or not the health stock is smaller or larger when the child is forward looking rather than myopic, 
ceteris paribus, since the parental transfer lowers the investments in health, while a reduction in the 
unhealthy behaviour, due to more child farsightedness, lowers the disinvestment in health. However, 
in cases in which the forward looking child exerts more than the myopic child in the unhealthy 
behaviour, health must necessary be lower for the former type. 
 
In order to compare child health levels in the two cases we solve the equation of motion of health 
capital in the forward-looking case and compare the solution to the corresponding solution in the 
myopic case. Equation system (13), together with the solutions (12), provides the optimal time 
paths for the parental transfer and child behaviour. The relation between health stocks on the one 
hand, and the price of health investment, the price of health-related behaviour, and the rate at 
which the behaviour influences, on the other, is summarized in Claim 4: 
 
Claim 4: assume that two children are identical, except that one is perfectly myopic (𝑚) and the 
other is forward looking. Let 𝑀𝑚(𝑡)∗, 𝜃𝑚(𝑡)∗, 𝐻𝑚(𝑡)∗ and 𝑀(𝑡)∗, 𝜃(𝑡)∗, 𝐻(𝑡)∗ be the optimal 
time-paths of the parental transfer, the health-related behaviour and the stock of health capital in 
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the myopic and forward looking cases, respectively. Then, (i) 𝑀𝑚(𝑡)∗ < 𝑀(𝑡)∗; (ii) 𝜃𝑚(𝑡)∗ ≶
𝜃(𝑡)∗ if, and only if, 𝑝𝜃 ≶
1
4
; and, (iii) 𝐻(𝑡)∗ ≶ 𝐻𝑚(𝑡)∗ if, and only if, 𝜑 ≶
2𝑝𝜃
𝜋(4𝑝𝜃−1)
 for ∀𝑡.  
 
Proof: since 𝜆𝑝∗ = 𝜆∗ (shadow price in the myopic case) ∀𝑡, part (i) follows from comparing (8) 
with the first equation of (13). Parts (ii) and (iii) are shown in the appendix.  
 
The relation between parental investments in child health in the two cases can be inferred from 
these results. There are two cases in which the investments are unambiguously larger or smaller in 
the forward-looking case: First, since the parental transfer is always larger in the forward-looking 
case, parental investments in child health will be smaller when the child is forward looking if the 
amount of health capital is smaller in this case, i.e., if 𝜑 <
2𝑝𝜃
𝜋(4𝑝𝜃−1)
. Second, if health capital is larger 
and the child exerts more of the health-related behaviour, it follows that also parental investments 
in child health must necessarily be larger. This situation occurs in the forward-looking case if 
𝑝𝜃 <
1
4
 (since 𝜑 > 0). 
 
Further, these results imply that for a high enough price, 𝑝𝜃, the forward-looking child will be 
more healthy than the myopic child, ceteris paribus. Similarly, for a given price, 𝑝𝜃, there is a level 
of the adverse health impact caused by a unit of 𝜃, 𝜑, above (below) which the forward-looking 
child is more (less) healthy than the myopic child. As was the case with the optimal time paths of 
the transfer and the health stock (Claim 3).      
 
The impact of less short-sightedness on health-related behaviours and health capital can 
summarized as follows: when the child starts to take the future into account, the incentives for 
behaving unhealthy are weakened, since he or she begins to value not only current health and 
resources, but also future health and the stream of parental transfers. In particular, the child starts 
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to value the amount of health at the end of the planning horizon. The net effects on health-related 
behaviour, health investments and health capital of less short short-sightedness depend on the 
marginal cost and the marginal health impact of the health behaviour.  
 
Numerical illustration 
We utilize different parametrizations of the closed-form solutions 
𝑀𝑚(𝑡)∗, 𝜃𝑚(𝑡)∗, 𝐻𝑚(𝑡)∗, 𝐼𝑚(𝑡)∗ and 𝑀(𝑡)∗, 𝜃(𝑡)∗, 𝐻(𝑡)∗, 𝐼(𝑡)∗ in order to illustrate the 
solutions. Thus, subsequent values of the solutions were calculated and plotted in diagrams with 
time on the horizontal axis. The following parameter values were used throughout: rization was 
used: 𝑈0 = 8; 𝐻0 = 1; 𝑎 = 0.005; 𝑏 = 0.001; ℎ = 0.02; 𝜌𝑝 = 0.05355; 𝜌𝑐 = 0.3;  𝛿 =
0.00058555; 𝑇 = 10; 𝑝𝜃 = 4.9;  𝜑 = 0.002. At each step, 𝑖, of the recursion, we checked that 
𝑀(𝑡)∗ ≥ 0, and if it was not, we adjusted the recursion equation so that 𝑀(𝑡)∗ was assigned the 
value 0. Figure 1 illustrates the time-paths in the myopic and forward-looking cases, for this 
parametrization. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
In this paper we have developed a dynamic and strategic model of parental investments in child 
health, when the child enjoys certain behaviours that are detrimental to health, and the parent is 
altruistic in the sense that he or she cares about child health and child consumption that is 
unrelated to health. The model includes a minimum required amount of child health capital at the 
end of the planning horizon. Our model adds to the small but growing literature that is concerned 
with strategic incentives when deciding about health-related efforts in a family context. The 
optimal behaviour responses were calculated applying a simple dynamic-game structure. 
 
The following predictions were derived ceteris paribus: 
(1) Parent-child transfers are larger when the child is forward-looking than when he or she is 
myopic; 
(2) A myopic child exerts more (less) of the health-adverse behaviour than a forward-looking 
child if the price of the behaviour is high (low); and  
(3) Child health is larger in the forward-looking case than in the myopic case, for behaviours 
that have a large adverse health impact, and lower for behaviours that have a small health 
impact. 
Comparative dynamics with respect to the exogenous parameters of the model is relatively 
straightforward, since we are able to obtain closed-form solutions for all endogenous variables. So, 
for instance,  
 
 
The required amount of child health capital at the time when the parent's planning horizon ends 
also plays a crucial role.       
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 The examples used in the text are assuming equal time preferences and equal values put on 
end-point health. – maybe add something about what happens to the results in Claim 4 
when these parameters change. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Claim 2   
The equation (5) is an ordinary linear and non-homogenous differential equation which has the 
general solution: 𝐻(𝑡)∗ = 𝐻0 ∙ 𝑒
−(𝛿−ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 + 𝑒−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 ∙ ∫ (
𝑦
𝜋
−
1
𝜋
∙𝑀(𝜏)∗−𝜑∙𝜃(𝜏)
𝑒
−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝜏
)
𝑡
0
𝑑𝜏. Let 
𝑦
𝜋
−𝑀(𝜏)∗∙(
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
)
𝑒
−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋)𝜏
=
𝑓(𝜏). Then, by Leibnitz rule the time derivate of 𝐻(𝑡)∗ is: (
ℎ
𝜋
− 𝛿) ∙ 𝑒−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 ∙ [𝐻0 +
∫ 𝑓(𝜏)
𝑡
0
𝑑𝜏] + 𝑒−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 ∙ ∫ 𝑓𝑡(𝜏)
𝑡
0
𝑑𝜏 + 𝑒−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 ∙ 𝑒(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 ∙ [
𝑦
𝜋
− 𝑀(𝑡)∗ ∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
)]. 𝑓𝑡(𝜏) = 0 
and, hence, it suffices to examine the first and third terms.  Since 𝑀(𝑡)∗ =
𝑈0
2
−
𝜆(𝑡)∗
2
∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
) 
they are both positive if 
𝑦
𝜋
>
𝑈0
2
∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
).  
 
Proof of Claim 3 
Part (ii): clearly, based on the proof of Claim 2, we only need to examine the third term of the time 
derivative of 𝐻(𝑡)∗: In the forward-looking case we have: 𝐻(𝑡)∗ = 𝐻0 ∙ 𝑒
−(𝛿−ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 + 𝑒−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 ∙
∫ (
𝑦−
1
𝜋
∙𝑀(𝜏)∗+𝜑∙𝜃(𝜏)∗
𝑒
−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝜏
)
𝑡
0
. Again, applying Leibnitz rule, gives ?̇?(𝑡)∗ = (
ℎ
𝜋
− 𝛿) ∙ 𝑒−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 ∙
[𝐻0 + ∫ 𝑓(𝜏)
𝑡
0
𝑑𝜏] + 𝑒−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 ∙ ∫ 𝑓𝑡(𝜏)
𝑡
0
𝑑𝜏 + 𝑒−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 ∙ 𝑒(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 ∙ [
𝑦
𝜋
−
1
𝜋
𝑀(𝑡)∗ − 𝜑 ∙ 𝜃(𝑡)∗)]. 
𝑓𝑡(𝜏) = 0 and, hence, it suffices to examine the first and third terms. Using the expressions for 
𝑀(𝑡)∗ and 𝜃(𝑡)∗ it is clear that ?̇?(𝑡)∗ > 0 if 
𝑦
𝜋
>
𝑈0
2
(
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
).  
 
Proof of Claim 4 
The time-path of health capital in the myopic (𝑚) case is: 𝐻𝑚(𝑡)∗ = 𝐻0 ∙ 𝑒
−(𝛿−ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 + 𝑒−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 ∙
∫ (
𝑦−𝑀(𝜏)∗∙(
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
)
𝑒
−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝜏
)
𝑡
0
𝑑𝜏. In the forward-looking case the time-path is: 𝐻(𝑡)∗ = 𝐻0 ∙ 𝑒
−(𝛿−ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 +
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𝑒−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝑡 ∙ ∫ (
𝑦−
1
𝜋
∙𝑀(𝜏)∗+𝜑∙𝜃(𝜏)∗
𝑒
−(𝛿−
ℎ
𝜋
)𝜏
)
𝑡
0
. Comparing the integrands, it is clear that 𝐻(𝑡)∗ < (>)𝐻𝑚(𝑡)∗ if, 
and only if, 𝑦 − 𝑀𝑚(𝜏)∗ ∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
) > (<) 𝑦 −
1
𝜋
∙ 𝑀(𝜏)∗ + 𝜑 ∙ 𝜃(𝜏)∗. Expanding the left- and 
right hand sides gives (equation system (13) gives the expressions for 𝑀∗ and 𝜃∗): 
 𝑦 − (
𝑈0
2
−
𝜆∗
2
∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
)) ∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
) and 𝑦 −
1
𝜋
∙ 𝑀(𝜏)∗ + 𝜑 ∙ 𝜃(𝜏)∗ =  𝑦 −
1
𝜋
(2𝑝𝜃 (
𝑈0
4𝑝𝜃
−
𝜆𝑝
∗
4𝑝𝜃𝜋
−
𝜆𝑐
∗
𝜑
2𝑝𝜃
) + 𝜆𝑐∗𝜑) + 𝜑 (
𝑈0
4𝑝𝜃
−
𝜆𝑝
∗
4𝑝𝜃𝜋
−
𝜆𝑐
∗
𝜑
2𝑝𝜃
). From 𝑎 = 𝑏 and 𝜌𝑝 = 𝜌𝑐 it follows that 
𝜆𝑝∗ = 𝜆𝑐∗ = 𝜆∗. Thus, the second left-hand side term is (leaving out 𝑦): 
𝑈0
2𝜋
+
𝑈0𝜑
4∙𝑝𝜃
−
𝜆∗
2
∙
(
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
)
2
=
𝑈0
2𝜋
+
𝑈0𝜑
4∙𝑝𝜃
−
𝜆∗
2𝜋2
−
𝜆∗𝜑
2𝑝𝜃𝜋
−
𝜆∗𝜑2
8𝑝𝜃
2. Terms two and three on the right hand side are: 
𝑈0
2𝜋
−
𝜆∗
2𝜋2
−
𝜆∗𝜑
𝜋
+
𝜆∗𝜑
𝜋
+
𝑈0𝜑
4𝑝𝜃
−
𝜆∗𝜑
4𝑝𝜃𝜋
−
𝜆∗𝜑2
2𝑝𝜃
. Comparing terms gives the following condition for 
𝐻(𝑡)∗ < (>)𝐻𝑚(𝑡)∗: −
𝜆∗𝜑
2𝑝𝜃𝜋
−
𝜆∗𝜑2
8𝑝𝜃
2 < (>) −
𝜆∗𝜑
4𝑝𝜃𝜋
−
𝜆∗𝜑2
2𝑝𝜃
, which is equivalent to: 
1
2𝑝𝜃𝜋
+
𝜑
8𝑝𝜃
2 <
(>)
1
4𝑝𝜃𝜋
+
𝜑
2𝑝𝜃
. Gathering terms and rearranging yields: 𝐻(𝑡)∗ ≶ 𝐻𝑚(𝑡)∗ if, and only if, 𝜑 ≶
2𝑝𝜃
𝜋(4𝑝𝜃−1)
.  
 
For behavioural differences we have 𝜃𝑚(𝑡)∗ − 𝜃(𝑡)∗ =  
1
2𝑝𝜃
(
𝑈0
2
−
𝜆∗
2
∙ (
1
𝜋
+
𝜑
2∙𝑝𝜃
)) −
 
1
2𝑝𝜃
(
𝑈0
2
−
𝜆𝑝
∗
2𝜋
− 𝜑𝜆𝑐∗). Since 𝜆∗ = 𝜆𝑝∗ = 𝜆𝑐∗, 𝜃𝑚(𝑡)∗ − 𝜃(𝑡)∗ = −
𝜑𝜆∗
8𝑝𝜃
2 +
𝜑𝜆∗
2𝑝𝜃
, and, hence, , 
𝜃𝑚(𝑡)∗ ≷ 𝜃(𝑡)∗ when 𝑝𝜃 ≷
1
4
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
 
 
 
 23 
REFERENCES 
Bergström, T. A Survey of Theories of the Family. in Handbook of Population Economics, ed. 
Mark Rosenzweig and Oded Stark. New York: North Holland, 1997; p21-74. 
 
Bolin, K., Jacobson, L. and B., Lindgren, 2001. The family as the producer of health – when 
spouses are Nash bargainers. Journal of Health Economics 20: 349-362. 
 
Bolin, K., Jacobson, L. and B., Lindgren, 2002a. The family as the producer of health – when 
spouses act strategically. Journal of Health Economics 21: 475-495. 
 
Bolin, K, L Jacobson and B Lindgren, 2002b. Employer investments in employee health - 
Implications for the family as health producer. Journal of Health Economics 21:563-583. 
 
Caputo,  
 
Chang, F., 1996. Uncertainty and investment in health. Journal of Health Economics 15: 369-376. 
 
Chang, Y.M., 2009. Strategic altruistic transfers and rent seeking within the family. Journal of 
Population Economics 22:1081-1098. 
 
Chang, Y.M., Weisman, D.L., 2005. Sibling rivalry and strategic parental transfers. Southern 
Economic Journal 71(4):821-836. 
 
Chu C.Y.C. “Promigeniture”. Journal of Political Economy 1991; 99(1):78-99.  
 
Dardanoni, V., and A. Wagstaff, 1987. Uncertainty, inequalities in health and the demand for 
health. Journal of Health Economics 6: 283-290. 
 
Dardanoni, V., and A. Wagstaff, 1990. Uncertainty and the demand for medical care. Journal of 
Health Economics 9: 23-38. 
 
Dockner, E. Differential Games in Economics and Management Science. Cambridge University 
Press, 2000. 
 
Dufwenberg, M., 2002. Marital investments, time consistency and emotions. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 48, 57–69. 
 
Ehrlich, I., and H. Chuma, 1990. A model of the demand for longevity and the value of life 
extensions. Journal of Political Economy 98: 761-782. 
 
Ewald CO, McNamara J, Houston A. Parental care as a differential game: A dynamic extension of 
the Houston–Davies game. Applied Mathematics and Computation 190 (2007) 1450–1465 
 
Forster, 2001. The meaning of death: some simulations of a model of healthy and unhealthy 
consumption. Journal of health economics 20:613-638.  
 
Grossman, M., 1972a. The Demand for Health: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 
Columbia University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
 24 
Grossman, M., 1972b. On the concept of health capital and the demand for health. Journal of 
Political Economy 80: 223 – 255. 
 
Grossman, M., 2000. The human capital model of the demand for health. In: Culyer, A.J. and J.P. 
Newhouse, (Eds.). Handbook of Health Economics: 347-408. 
 
Hori, K, Shibata, A. Dynamic Game Model of Endogenous Growth with Consumption 
Externalities. J Optim Theory Appl, 2010;145: 93–107 
 
Jacobson, L., 2000. The family as producer of health – An extension of the Grossman model. 
Journal of Health Economics 19: 611-637. 
 
Kenkel, D.S., 2000. Prevention. In: Culyer, A.J., Newhouse, J.P. (Eds.). Handbook of Health 
Economics: 1675-1720. 
 
Kenkel, D.S., 1991. Health behaviour, health knowledge, and schooling. Journal of Political 
Economy 99: 287-305. 
 
King, A., 1982. Human capital and the risk of divorce: an asset in search of a property right. 
Southern Economic Journal 49 (2), 536–541. 
 
Konrad, K., Lommerud, K., 1995. Non-Cooperative families. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 
97, 581–601. 
 
Konrad, K., Lommerud, K., 2000. The bargaining family revisited. Canadian Journal of Economics 
33, 471-487. 
 
Liljas, B., 1998. The demand for health with uncertainty and insurance. Journal of Health 
Economics 17: 153-170. 
 
Liu, X. Explaining the gap between the theoretical prediction and experimental evidences about 
the investment in the spouse’s human capital. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 2009;38:411–414 
 
Muurinen, J.M., 1982. Demand for health. A generalised Grossman model. Journal of Health 
Economics 1: 5-28.  
 
Novak, AJ, Feichtinger, G, Leitmann, G. A Differential Game Related to Terrorism: Nash and 
Stackelberg Strategies. J Optim Theory Appl, 2010; 144:533–555. 
 
Oosterbeek, H., Sonnemans, J., van Velzen, S., 2003. The need for marriage contracts: an 
experimental study. Journal of Population Economics 16, 431–453. 
 
Van Long, Ngo. A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics. Worls Scientific Publishing, 2010.  
